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529 
INTRODUCTION: 
UN CYGNE NOIR 
Peter Goodrich* 
I have made a brief study of the law review genre of epitaphs.  Or 
if that is perhaps too coherent a description, as it probably is, for what 
are usually miscellaneous brief prefatory statements in memoriam for 
departed colleagues they could equally be called brief encryptions or 
eulogies of disembarkation.  They follow, in a necessarily muted style, 
the form of classical encomia or funeral orations.  They praise the 
departed pedagogue for insight and character, wit and wisdom, 
generosity and vision.  They offer intimate anecdotes, private affections 
shared in and around the law school, but because the deceased was, in 
the end, simply a law professor it would be unseemly and improper to 
lavish too great a degree of laudation upon the pedagogue’s past.  The 
classical themes of public virtue, of political adventure or heroic deeds 
hardly conform to the quiet death of a teacher.  A law professor is not a 
statesman, legal academics are fairly marginal to the growth of 
scholarship, and the Socratic lecture is peripheral on the best of counts 
to the advancement of educational ideals or practices.  Where legal 
scholars have achieved public recognition they have tended to leave the 
academy and having lived their lives elsewhere they garner their 
encomia in other spaces less idiosyncratic and obscure than the student-
edited law review. 
If the epitaphs printed in law reviews are local and brief, this is 
doubtless because it is the home institution that publishes the terse array 
of recollections.  The law review is a peculiar publishing forum, a 
strange artifact of legal education.  It is supposedly a scholarly journal 
 
 *  My thanks diversely and fulsomely to the participants in the Derrida/America Conference 
held at Cardozo School of Law, February 20-21, 2005.  Especial thanks and amicable recognition 
to my co-organizer and the intellectual driving force behind the event, Anselm Haverkamp.  
Thanks to Brandy Warren for admirable organizational efforts, to Michel Rosenfeld for advice on 
the French, and to Simon Critchley for his political intelligence.  Thanks for full, frank, and finely 
honed comments from Neil Duxbury, Pierre Legrand, Tom Mitchell, Chris Stone, Adam 
Thurschwell, and Cornelia Vismann.  Thanks, if thanks were not so much less than her due, to 
Linda Mills for extraordinary insight and for the coruscating wit of her diagnoses of motive.  This 
volume makes peace or at least reckoning with two earlier events.  The first a conference held in 
1989 and its progeny Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice published in 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919-1726 (1990).  The second a symposium held at N.Y.U. in 1995 and published as 
DECONSTRUCTION IS/IN AMERICA (Anselm Haverkamp ed., 1995). 
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but it is edited by youthful students.  We can note immediately that the 
law review epitaph is already in this sense hard to classify rhetorically.  
There is first off a certain youthful discomfort, an unease that 
accompanies too long a sojourn with the emotions of the elderly staring 
into the face of what is inevitably also their own demise.  As with its 
other products, the law review here invents its own curious norms of 
genre.  The eulogies, and they are almost without exception eulogies, 
are light, affective, strangely nostalgic and closer to literary portraits 
than to scholarly evaluations.  If there is a dominant narrative theme it is 
that they strive to capture an existence that exceeded the legal, stories of 
exceptions, incidents of a life before the law that made the deceased 
something other than merely and unexceptionally a law professor. 
The epitaph steps outside the genre of doctrine and law.  It is more 
interesting and if attended closely it probably teaches more than the 
usual run of unread policy statements or second order law reporting that 
the reviews are prone to publishing.  If examples can be forgiven, we 
learn in a short epitaph for Dean Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School—
I am starting at the top—that he “was fond of saying that, as dean, the 
only things he could decide were the placement of portraits and the 
gender designation of lavatories—and that, even as to these, it was not 
all that clear.”1  Which is an interesting insight into a somewhat gloomy 
self-perception but not obviously the stuff of law review scholarship.  It 
might have been had Rostow been of firmer metal and inverted his 
decenal project to the gender designation of portraits and the placement 
of lavatories, but he did not and the anecdote remains fond and 
incidental. 
Stay with Yale Law Journal if you will and we can turn to the 
tributes paid on his passing to Myres S. McDougal, “a big, handsome 
man.”2  The only woman to contribute does note that Myres was “white, 
male, and from a Southern Methodist background—hardly a minority 
icon” but she goes on immediately to corroborate the general view of 
the deceased subject of the memorial inscriptions as being an iconoclast, 
a virtuoso and lifelong friend who even while “writing path-breaking 
volumes of great importance . . . was nonetheless always available to his 
students.”3  Or when Kellis Parker, the first tenured African-American 
law professor at Columbia University died, suddenly and much too 
young, it was his humanism, his everyday aesthetics, the trombone in 
his office, the music down the corridor, the jazz that got remembered.4  
 
 1 Guido Calebresi, The Generosity of a Dean, 113 YALE L.J. 5 (2003). 
 2 Andrew R. Willard, Myres Smith McDougal: A Life of and About Human Dignity, 108 
YALE L.J. 927, 932 (1999). 
 3 Dame Rosalyn Higgins, McDougal as Teacher, Mentor, and Friend, 108 YALE L.J. 957, 
958 (1999). 
 4 Kendall Thomas, Remarks at Memorial Service for Professor Kellis E. Parker, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 699 (2001). 
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Life is short, law is long.  Life departs, law remains.  Mindful of that 
perhaps, the epitaphic narrative is formulated to capture the life that left, 
not the law that lives on.  It is as if there is no time for analysis of 
writings or critical evaluations of work as the law professor’s literary 
coffin is lowered.  Great books, bestsellers or casebooks that went into 
multiple editions, genre changing law review articles gain a mention, 
but in economical terms, because they were numerous, because they 
survived, because of their intimate impact upon the memorialist’s ego, 
and not, or not here in any sustained or critical sense, because of their 
argument or content. 
There is something peculiar about the law review memorial.  It 
briefly upsets the genre of law and it does so in multiple ways.  
Consider the norms of law review style—the unpublishable dispatches 
from The Bluebook5—as well as the customary norms, the “tacit and 
illiterate consensus” of the law review office.  The “books,” and it is 
significant of a certain misrecognition that the issues of the law review 
are so termed, are student selected and edited, sometimes fiercely so, 
but the epitaphs are clearly symposia generated and edited by or for the 
faculty.  They represent, in the face of death, in a state of exception, a 
momentary truce in the citation manual wars, an instance of cessation of 
the violence of editing, a surprising glimpse of an editorial no man’s 
land.6  Of the other norms that are broken the most obvious comes in the 
form of an influx of the personal and nominate, of the first person 
singular and its subjective reminiscences, its autobiographical and 
affectionate recountings. 
The stylistic rule of objectivity, of the impersonal, of the fully and 
tangibly referenced, of the epistemologically justified is suddenly 
displaced by the incursion of memory and experience.  The gold 
standard of The Bluebook, the law of solid foundations that requires that 
every proposition have a visibly available prior source, a citation, a 
tangible or at least printable support, a photograph of origin, is waived 
in favor chimeric glimpses of a liminal individuality.  And to this we 
should add that the genre of the epitaph also flouts the substantive rule 
of law review content, namely that what is published is about law.  
Sometimes, some would say all too often, the much prized object of the 
review or journal or quarterly, the fetish law, is honored by a merely 
conjunctive presence—pieces on “Tina Turner and law,” “Semiramis 
 
 5 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. 
eds., 18th ed. 2005).  On which, see the indispensable Penelope Pether, Discipline and Punish: 
Despatches from the Citation Manual Wars and Other (Literally) Unspeakable Stories, 10 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 101 (2001), and her subsequent reprise of those themes in Penelope Pether, 
Negotiating the Structures of Violence, 15 SOC. SEMIOTICS 5 (2005). 
 6 I am borrowing here from Cornelia Vismann, Starting from Scratch: Concepts of Order in 
No Man’s Land, in WAR, VIOLENCE AND THE MODERN CONDITION 46 (Bernd Hüppauf ed., 
1997). 
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and law” or some metaphor for legal theory, say “baseball” or just 
possibly “The Big Fear”7—but law, the “objet petit a,” the strange 
subject of love, is always also there, co-present, consubstantial.  In the 
epitaph, however, that presence is subordinated to life, to literature, to 
the face and figure, the prosopopoeia of the departed.  Again, law and 
specifically the law of genre is flouted.  The epitaph offers a moment of 
mixing of the literary and the juridical, an instance of the suspension of 
law, and that is a good moment to introduce the subject of this 
symposium, the critical appreciation of the late Jacques Derrida and of 
his contribution to legal studies in the Anglophone world.8 
There is an element then of the epitaphic to this venture as well.  It 
too comes with black borders to the pages, it too says adieu, farewell, 
well done.  We cannot and should not ignore that context of mourning, 
that sense of what Jacques termed “all-out friendship” that comes 
ironically or sadly enough when the time of the friend has passed.9  Not 
only should that affective and amicable context not be ignored, it is a 
signal virtue, an exemplary moment of incongruence, of internal 
limitation or deconstruction which comes very close to capturing the 
curious dissonance between Derrida and law.  And that is my 
preliminary point, a properly paradoxical initial gesture.  This 
symposium looks back critically and fondly upon the work of a non-
lawyer, it re-evaluates the oeuvre of a philosophical aesthete who 
tirelessly sought if not to avoid the law at least to waive or suspend it.  
If there was a constant theme to Derrida’s work, an intuition and 
argument that was present from the beginning, from long before his 
resounding encounter with the Cardozo School of Law and its critical 
 
 7 Respectively, Gary Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N.M. L. REV. 
479 (1986); Peter Goodrich, Operatic Hermeneutics: Harmony, Euphantasy, and Law in 
Rossini’s Semiramis, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1649 (1999) (cited, I am proud to report, as the most 
obscure law review title locatable at short notice by the ignoramus—“I haven’t actually read this 
article”—Mark F. Anderson, There’s No Business Like Show Business, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 271, 
271 n.1 (2000)); Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 
YALE L.J. 227 (1994); Alan Hunt, The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism, 35 MCGILL L.J. 
507 (1990). 
 8 I have lingered on this theme of genre long enough.  Some day I will publish a fuller study 
but it is worth also briefly noting that the tributes published in U.S. law reviews are somewhat 
distinctive, counter even to their European peers, by dint of the importance of the authors of the 
tributes as well as their subjects.  In Europe, the tributes are often unsigned and seldom have 
anything to do with the life or work of the author of the epitaph, the celebrant or obituarist.  In the 
U.S. law review there is a star system operative that seems to require that the big name of the 
deceased gain recognition from big names.  And if you are a big name it must be really hard not 
to mention yourself as well.  That is how it goes.  The measure of greatness is, after all, not only a 
matter of your influence, your place in the polls.  It is also, in the U.S. at least, and at a more 
personal level a question of the stature of those who follow and applaud you.  Their greatness 
allows them to recognize your importance, and without marking that dubious equality, the 
continued circulation of the insignia of status might well be a little threatened. 
 9 JACQUES DERRIDA, THE WORK OF MOURNING 214 (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas 
eds., 2004). 
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legal professoriat, it was that of a nomos, of a system of grammar, a 
scripture that preceded and determined subsequent or secondary 
institutions and laws.10  His theme was that of a prior instance or work, 
a politics that came in advance of law, a conceptual space or even 
justice before the law.  In his later work, just to follow the theme 
through in this initial depiction, it was the politics of friendship, 
Aristotle’s concept of an amity prior and superior to law, Cicero’s lex 
amicitia or law of friendship that precedes and stalls the cold calculus, 
the dead hand of legality.  Derrida deferred here and throughout to the 
poetic and literary that precedes and eventually will dictate the moment 
of legal judgment and the mode of its development. 
We can begin then by saying quite confidently that Derrida made 
no contribution to law.  He had nothing to say about positive law.  He 
was commendably silent with respect to the regime of norms that passes 
for a system of legal doctrine.  Even or especially toward the end, in 
condemning the death penalty in particular, his opposition was 
philosophical and political.  He endeavored to understand the penalty, 
he addressed death in terms of the theater of cruelty, and even when 
speaking to lawyers he made no concessions to legal argument.  And 
that in its way was a touch subversive and potentially a little hedonistic.  
It offered a halcyon possibility, the positive academic freedom to vacate 
the drudgery of policy, the diktat of precedent in favor of more liberated 
forms of writing, in pursuit of other norms.11  Critical jurists could not 
of course go outside the text, but they could slip away from positive 
law.  Not hors de texte of course, but hors de loi.  That was quite 
enough to annoy a disparate set of disciplinary conventions and the 
literary norms of the academic genres.  The Anglophone philosophical 
establishment certainly didn’t welcome him.  Unsurprisingly many 
lawyers also believed it to be inappropriate to think outside their 
discipline or to address the presuppositions, the linguistic and other 
norms that comprise the before of law.  It was a little bit threatening, a 
touch too critical.  It was hard enough work learning law without having 
to become scholars versed in rhetoric, linguistics, or semiotics as well.  
It would make the tenure track a lot harder, it would dethrone the 
epistemic solipsism of legal analysis, it might also eat up much of  the 
 
 10 FRANÇOIS CUSSET, FRENCH THEORY: FOUCAULT, DERRIDA, DELEUZE & CIE ET LES 
MUTATIONS DE LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS 136 (2003), for example, in discussing 
“the Derrida effect” in literary and cultural studies, goes on to say: “In a wholly other domain, 
one can easily see the importance of Derrida’s symposium contributions on ‘deconstruction and 
law’ at Cardozo Law School in New York in 1990-1991, for the development of the ‘critical legal 
studies’ movement.” 
 11 The most notable proponent of this perspective is Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere 
to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).  The issue of what exactly will replace normativism 
remained appropriately unresolved in PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).  
It is lengthily lucubrated in a symposium dedicated to Schlag’s work in 57 MIAMI L. REV.  
(2003). 
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marginal time devoted to consultancy or practice.  It was in sum a style 
that seemed to the uninitiated at least to threaten indeterminacy, what 
the early common lawyers were wont to term a miserable state of 
things, a vague and uncertain law, and that of course cannot be a good 
thing.12  Indeed it is best left to epitaphs, to margins, prefaces and other 
doctrinally penumbral spaces. 
So Derrida had nothing to say to lawyers.  He said nothing directly 
about the law that lawyers practice.  He was not interested in the juristic 
rush to judgment, the arbitrary arbitrium of legal decision.  He kept 
deferring discussion of law, suspending the moment of judgment, 
asking prior questions about the nomos that comes in advance of 
decision.  Such questioning of the origin, the prior, the roots could seem 
a trifle academic.  Indeed it was and is somewhat evasive if all that 
deconstruction did was to set up and pull down the binary opposition of 
law to non-law.  The “Derrida effect” would then be no more than an 
opaque mystery, a campus leisure drug for addicts of “derridium [and] 
le lacanium,” as Bruno Latour wittily put it in a discussion of the Sokal 
Affair.13  But beware of denunciations of difference, of the discounting 
of the unfamiliar, of satirical regression.  They will generally have 
political roots and will depend less upon evaluation or even knowledge 
of the work denounced as upon a prior and unthought desire to exile and 
exclude.  Simon shows that well in his review in this volume of the 
travesty of the philosophical responses to Derrida’s death.14  They 
hadn’t read his work.  They denounced him because of an image of his 
work.  Because of the work they hadn’t done themselves.  There was 
something unfamiliar, a political threat generated by this philology, this 
alien yet clearly significant continental erudition authored, one might 
add, by an African Jew.15 
Derrida’s encounter with law, his deference to and deferral of the 
juridical, his non-encounter with legal forms of analysis—the technical 
subjects of doctrine—was both pivotal and emblematic.  It marks, 
paradoxically, the last and most political stage of his work and of his 
life.  It was only after encountering the common law school, Cardozo to 
be precise, a school incidentally that was too young and too lowly in 
rank to have any history of law review epitaphs of its own, only after 
raising explicitly the question of the possibility of justice, that Derrida 
turned directly to the political.  There were other events and other 
headings, of course, but the dramaturgical setting of the law school and 
 
 12 Most notably the maxim res est misera ubi ius est vagum et incertum.  ROGER COKE, 
JUSTICE VINDICATED 42 (London, Newcomb 1660) (2 Salk. 512). 
 13 Bruno Latour, Y a-t-il une science après la guerre froide?, LE MONDE, Jan. 18, 1997. 
 14 Simon Critchley, Derrida: The Reader, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 553 (2005). 
 15 For discussion of several of these themes in a legal context, see the elegantly digressive 
Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of 
Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033 (2001). 
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the question of justice raised by lawyers signaled an all-important shift 
in his work towards the political, towards the justice that, as he pointed 
out, precedes and exceeds mere law.  It was not law that interested him 
but rather justice and injustice, the between the lines, the exception that 
marked something more and other than mere law.  It was after the 
conference on law, after his bravura performance of “deconstruction and 
the possibility of justice,” after subsequently and attentively sitting 
through days of papers by critical legal scholars, after listening to the 
ex-teamster Drucilla Cornell addressing the “violence of the 
masquerade,” and former brewery lawyer Chuck Yablon undressing 
legal forms—they are “boring”—that he entered the most engaged and 
interventionist stage of his career.16 
Derrida died, and we are inscribing here a curious and critical 
epitaph.  Note then that the question of injustice, of the possibility of 
justice, inevitably starts with the litany of improper deaths, of death 
before its time, of the simple injustice of death itself.  The epitaph is in 
that sense strictly legal.  The inscription in memoriam records the 
archetypal injustice, the injustice that is now Jacques’s as well, the 
injustice that he increasingly spoke to in his later years, as if in 
premonition, in protest, and always in a political manner.  These were 
the years of Specters of Marx, of the work in South Africa against 
apartheid with Nelson Mandela, his opposition to the death penalty and 
his politicization of friendship as the theme that underpins the 
possibility of justice and the practice of law.  I guess one could say that 
law school, his encounter with law professors, was a galvanizing 
moment, a sudden and terrible reminder of the urgency of the question 
of justice, of the enormity of what remained to be done in his lifetime, 
in the scarce fifteen years he had left, the remaining time in which to 
inscribe how he would live-on, or in his own words:  
[N]ot toward death but toward a living-on [sur-vie], namely, a trace 
of which life and death would themselves be but traces and traces of 
traces, a survival whose possibility in advance comes to disjoin or 
dis-adjust the identity to itself of the living present as well as of any 
effectivity.  There is then some spirit.  Spirits.  And one must reckon 
with them . . . the more than one/no more one.17 
The question of justice was too important for law school and lawyers.  It 
was urgent and active, human and living, in a way that law could never 
be, if only because the passage of property and the structuring of death 
are law’s primary tasks.  That, or as the early common lawyers were 
 
 16 Respectively Drucilla Cornell, The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as 
Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047 (1990); Charles M. Yablon, Forms, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1349 (1990). 
 17 JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF 
MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, at xx (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994). 
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wont to put it, law is pristine, it speaks to posterity, abstractly, across 
generations and not to the nominate, not to living.18  So first then the 
question of injustice and the necessity of reckoning, of naming, 
acknowledging, accounting—providing epitaphs, keeping ethical and 
political records.  The theme is central to Derrida’s account of justice 
and it is his first and final interruption of the blandness of legal 
discourse.  Citing Levinas, he argued in Force of Law that justice is a 
relation to others, “to the faces of otherness that govern me,” and most 
forcefully of all there has to be “an equitable honoring of faces.”19  No 
escaping it, if there is to be equity, if injustices are to be undone.  It is in 
this vein, in the dedicatory passage to Specters—a work of specters and 
for specters, for faces seeking visibility, demanding to be named—
Derrida remembers a fallen opponent of apartheid:  
But one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, 
not even an exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of 
the flag or of martyrdom.  A man’s life, as unique as his death, will 
always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol.  
And this is precisely what a proper name should always name.20   
Specters of Marx was marked by a verbal frontispiece, a shadow 
portrait—the ghost of Chris Hani. 
Defiant words, a demand even that faces be put to historic acts of 
resistance, that intellectuals take up their responsibilities and oppose 
injustice, name its causes and put faces to its perpetrators.  The 
equitable honoring of the face requires that much.  It requires that 
scholars take a stand, that they make their own decisions, that they 
accept an authority and equity that comes before the law, the merely 
human and positive shadow of spirit, of “the more than one/no more 
one.”  The face contests the realm of the no more one, just as the 
epitaph challenges the amorphousness of death and offers one last 
adventure in naming, a final glimpse of the face.  And here we can 
pause in silent and critical recollection.  Derrida sought to name most 
openly in the face of death.  This act of nominating, this “all-out 
friendship” for the deceased plays a pivotal role in his work.  It is most 
obvious and evident in his funeral orations but the theme of the face, the 
equity of attention to the face is a figure—an allegory—that suffuses all 
his work.  It is there, maybe not loud enough, not evident enough, but 
nonetheless present, covertly intruding, riling and stinging the arbiters 
of convention and the promulgators of law. 
If one could say one thing of Jacques, it would be that he had a 
 
 18 SIR JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER 51 (1631); SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, In Praise 
of the Laws of England, in ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 67 (S. Lockwood ed., 
1997). 
 19 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919, 959 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990). 
 20 DERRIDA, supra note 17, at xv. 
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style.  It was “not without opacity,”21 indeed it was frequently tortured, 
often prolix, inevitably French.  It was also his, first person singular, 
indelibly individual, a calligraphy that constantly traced a unique name 
and face.  In my view the style was itself a prosopopoeia, an inscription 
as unintended as it was accurate of an authorial face.  It was a hesitant 
but very personal mode of taking a stand, of being counted, of facing 
off.  Derrida was always inserting himself, making appearances in his 
own writing, playing with images, showing his face.  He was constantly 
making up words, inventing neologisms such as phallogocentrism, 
circumfession, incompossibility, différance, the archetrace, 
destinerrance, or even deconstruction as a variant form of Heidegger’s 
term destruktion.  He advocated free play with words and was 
constantly punning, twisting from ambiguity to metaphor to metonymy 
and back.  He loved to interpret slips, typographical errors, philological 
elisions.  He even published his love letters, his postcards, in La Carte 
Postale.  He attended to the frivolous while also giving inordinate 
weight to the work of mourning and making the genre of the encomium 
peculiarly his own.  And he would turn up.  For all his philosophy of the 
impossibility of self-presence, he was never a “no-show,” he was 
serious about his engagements, committed to his seminars around the 
globe, grateful for the opportunity and attention, and generous, 
inordinately generous of his face time. 
It is possible that one of the secrets of his success, the mystery of 
his fame, lies in the attraction of his face.  Not just that he was beautiful.  
Well kempt, a little narcissistic.  Here was a man, a famous man, who 
was willing to spend time listening, who was attentive to texts and to 
questions, who hadn’t yet always already made up his mind.  Such was 
a signal and feminine virtue, this willingness to wait, this attention to 
detail, this demand that we suspend the moment of judgment, calculus 
and law.  One could even recollect in a somewhat Derridean style that 
his commitment to suspending or waiving the law has its etymological 
root in a legal designation of the feminine.  To waive comes from 
medieval Latin.  Waivaria was the outlawry of a woman, waivaria 
mulieris, to be exact, meaning that because her husband had been 
outlawed she too was forsaken and abandoned.22  She became faceless, 
friendless, in the early definition of utlagary or outlawry and was 
neither to be conversed with nor given food in Rastell’s definition.23  In 
Bracton’s elaboration, the waive was also caput lupinum, subject to 
 
 21 CUSSET, supra note 10, at 118. 
 22 On waiveo and its variants, see MEDIEVAL LATIN WORD-LIST (J.H. Baxter & Charles 
Johnson eds., 1934).  On the legal implications, see THOMAS BLOUNT, NOMO-LEXICON: A LAW 
DICTIONARY (1670). 
 23 JOHN RASTELL, THE EXPOSICIONS OF THE TERMS OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1567) 
(under the word utlary); JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER: OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE 
SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS (1607) (under the word utlagaria). 
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immediate death, not homo but one might say here mulier sacer.24  She 
existed in a state of exception, an outlaw by association, and so in a 
personal state of iustitium in which the law had also been suspended, by 
contiguity or association, as regards her. 
The crucial subject of recognition is not of course the medieval 
root of the suspension of law but rather the choice whereby Derrida 
took up the position of the waive or feminine outlaw because of his 
suspicion that there was something amiss in this designation of 
friendlessness or bestiality, in this savage state of exception, in this non-
recognition of the face of the other.  So think of it this way: The 
political thread that runs through the work and with increasing force or 
directness is that of championing that which has, and then those who 
have been separated, set aside, or subject to apartheid.  He took the side 
of the separated, the excluded, the waived, the outlawed and he did so in 
multiple forms.  He began with marginal texts, with absent presence, 
with traces, supplements, prefaces and all the other liminal sites where 
those who have been set apart press against the barrier of their 
repression.  He introduced rhetoric into philosophy, aesthetics into 
epistemology, and addressed the politics of friendship in the production 
of truth and did so in his own radical if tentative way.  He focused one 
might say almost exclusively upon the genres of the excluded, the 
literary, the poetic, the painted, the postcard.  Then in the radicalizing 
instance of his confrontation with law, he addressed not law but the 
before of law, the question of injustice, the possibility of justice, the 
nomos extant before legality intrudes.  Then apartheid itself, its specters, 
its outlaws, its dead. 
It is a long list that also included many attempts to bring the 
separated to visibility and into amity in work on hospitality, mourning 
and the democracy to come.  But still the constant theme of exclusion, 
of exile, of experiencing life, as Barbara elucidates in her contribution, 
as an exile from his mother tongue, and also one suspects from 
himself.25  He had hopes, no question of that, but he was also always 
traveling, abroad, away and on his own special counterpath.26  He was 
 
 24 BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 362 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 
1968) (1256). On the Roman legal doctrine of homo sacer, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO 
SACER (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). 
 25 Barbara Vinken, The Love of the Letter: Derrida and His Only Lady, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
877 (2005).  Her reference is JACQUES DERRIDA, MONOLINGUALISM OF THE OTHER; OR, THE 
PROSTHESIS OF ORIGIN (1998), a key text on the sense of exile, of deferral of self-presence, its 
necessary mediation via a language that is not one’s own. 
 26 CATHERINE MALABOU & JACQUES DERRIDA, COUNTERPATH 4 (David Wills trans., 2004):  
In one way or another the Western traveler always follows in the steps of Ulysses.  For 
Derrida, the Odyssey is the very form of an economy, literally the “law of the house” 
(oikonomia, from oikos, “house,” “residence,” and nomos, “law”).  It is as if, according 
to what is a paradox in appearance only, the voyage that is the Odyssey signified  in the 
first instance the possibility of returning home. 
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an exile from home and he was fond of saying that it will end badly or, 
in a more philosophical mode he devoted an entire book to the 
elaboration of an immense rumor generated by a fragment attributed to 
Aristotle by Diogenes: “Oh my friends, there is no friend.”27  Here I 
would read that fragment as a plea, in the vocative and expressive of a 
hope: there is no singular and authoritative friend, no God or law, only 
the future and active possibility of friendship with the friendless, the 
democracy to come as he liked to call it, the coming community built 
around the ethics of honoring the face, founded on and governed by its 
relationship to the other, to the more than one.  If the face is the index of 
the soul, a law without face, without attention to the face, is a law 
without soul, a medium of injustice, not a minor nihilism but an active 
principle of annihilation. 
That takes me to my second point.  Like Aristotle, Derrida believed 
that friendship is more important than law.28  He believed that amicitia 
preceded lex.  That priority of the lex amicitia means that law is 
unthinkable without first thinking friendship.  It is not just that law 
needed friends, the aid of those outside the law, prior to law, before 
calculus and decision.  That is one meaning, a humanist interpretation of 
the classical fragment.  But it connotes much more.  If one cannot think 
law without first thinking friendship then the viscera of amity, the 
secrets and intimacies of friendship are internal to both the jurist and the 
juridical.  In this sense, the philosophical project as such is one of 
commitment to the spirit of amity, to friendship, to the building of 
personal relationships.  And these are surprising intimacies, unusual 
disclosures, when and if they come.  Not least the confession of 
intimacy, the appearance of the person, which necessarily makes 
discourse a touch more equivocal because intimacy and feeling are 
relational, and more precisely because these affects relate meaning to 
the instance of amity that precedes and defines law.  At an etymological 
level that is certainly one root of the Greek word philosophy.  It is made 
up of philein or friendship, and sophia or wisdom and joined they mean 
either friendship for wisdom, or the wisdom of friends.  Benveniste 
makes those links in an authoritative way and points out not only that 
friendship and citizenship are homonyms but also that philein had the 
further meaning of “to kiss,” and kissing brought with it the 
connotations of affiliation, family, and fraternity.  These are the figures 
of belonging, of having somewhere to return to when all is said and 
done.  All of which is to say that in his quiet and lengthy manner 
Derrida was very concerned not with law but with the instance of amity, 
 
 27 JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP 1 (George Collins trans., 1997). 
 28 Rather than repeat references and themes, I will refer here to Peter Goodrich, The Immense 
Rumor, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 199 (2004), where I discuss these etymologies and the 
arguments that can be drawn from them at length. 
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the affect and bond that preceded and dictated law in democratic 
polities. 
Take, for example, Derrida’s most literary work, The Postcard, of 
which I am inordinately fond.  Here he offered an analysis of his own 
itinerary, he published his postcards, his billets doux, his love letters, 
notes from his diaries, snippets of phone conversations, and numerous 
other gallant and amatory gestures.  If this was not a work of pure 
distraction, an exercise in exhibitionism, a narcissistic self-immolation, 
there had to be a logic to these glimpses of self-exposure, of amity and 
amour.  The easy answer is that the trajectory of the work was governed 
by what François Callières termed La Logique des amans—the logic of 
lovers—and which dates back to a lex amatoria or law of love that was 
separated, set apart, outlawed in the early modern formation of common 
law.29  There is what Foucault termed a positive unconscious to science 
and to legal science, scientia legalis, as well.30  Amongst the exclusions 
that went into the constitution of the early modern juridical tradition 
was the signal annexation of the jurisdiction of love.  The choice of 
jurisdiction, as antique as the law itself, between amity and judgment, 
between love and law was eradicated.  The twelfth century rule, 
encoded in the laws of Henry I that agreement conquers law and love 
judgment (pactum enim legem vincit et amor iudicum) was erased from 
memory or at best exiled within an insouciant and imperialistic 
rhetorical tradition of exclusively juridical governance by means of 
positively enacted norms. 
Consciously, or perhaps more likely also unconsciously Jacques 
was engaged already and early on in reviving an antique lex amicitia, a 
gay science, a rhetorical law that had long been in abeyance, hidden 
obscurely and antithetically within.  So here again he was busy 
honoring the faces of the excluded, building a relationship with the 
other, taking his time and attending to distant traces of affect, long 
forgotten names, philological fragments, unattributed remains.  But start 
with this paradoxical notion of a lovers’ logic: “The logic of love is the 
art of discerning true love from false, and of reasoning justly in relation 
to all that happens to the lovers.”31  So here is a glimpse again of a root 
or before of the law, a veiled origin whose source, according to 
Callières, is a “philosophe sans barbe,” a philosopher who, 
 
 29 The wonderful text referred to is FRANÇOIS CALLIÈRES, LA LOGIQUE DES AMANS OU 
L’AMOUR LOGICIEN (1668). 
 30 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 14 (1976).  For discussion, see PETER 
GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS, at ch. 1 
(1990). 
 31 CALLIÈRES, supra note 29, at 4.  As to the tradition of courts of love viewed from a 
juridical perspective, see Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the 
Judgments of Love, 48 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1996).  PETER GOODRICH, LAWS OF LOVE: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL MANUAL, is forthcoming in 2006. 
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exceptionally, is without a beard.  It is an apposite attribution of 
authorship because it means that the philosopher of love is beardless, of 
feminine appearance, a woman.  Diotima in Plato.  Here Derrida 
amongst the moderns.  But whatever image one chooses, it has to be 
said that the face of the feminine, beauty and all that it connotes, had 
been absent from the modern Western legal tradition more or less, with 
a few exceptions, from its inception.  Even where the feminine did 
appear in public, according to the humanist Jan Luis Vives, she had to 
be shamefaced (shamefast), meaning veiled and looking away.32 
Note also that Callières’s concern was with a justice between 
lovers, with what Derrida termed an equitable honoring of the face, and 
so connotes a public attention to private emotions, an address of serious 
speech toward the most intimate of spaces, the heartland of amity, the 
relation between lovers, the friendship between husband and wife.  This 
space, according to Callières, is distinctly aesthetic—a question of 
passion, beauty and imagination—and the justice appropriate to it is 
literary, a matter he continues “of the ardent desire to write and to 
transform myself into the object that gave birth to my love.”33  That 
could almost be Jacques writing, echoing almost 300 years later to the 
day the sentiments of a philosopher of love who lived during the great 
era of the birth of the novel amongst the proto-feminist cells of the 
Parisian précieuses of the 1650’s.  And certainly there is something 
precious, linguistically and legally, in Derrida’s work, in his ethics of 
language, in his imaginative divagations, in his flights of fantasy.  There 
is no question but that he was calling up a feminist spirit, a female 
“more than one,” and that he introduced that logic of love into his 
writing, and into his thinking of law.  He was very much a “philosophe 
sans barbe,” Democritus and not Heraclitus, a thinker in a feminine key. 
Returning finally to Derrida’s (non) contribution to law we can 
now place it in a trajectory that mirrors his project and counterpath as a 
whole.  The paradox of his work, its central tenet and key, was a literary 
resistance to law, a refusal of the anti-intellectualism of lawyers, and yet 
his most famous conceptual innovation, the neologism and practice of 
deconstruction eventually comes to be defined as justice.  
Deconstruction is justice.  Which entails of necessity that 
deconstruction is dependant upon law, defined by legality and of course 
by the endless deferral of the moment of passage from justice to law, 
from thought to decision.  He was indeed very rigorous.  He never got 
to talk about law, he never seemed to want to, he held off.  What he did 
do, however, was take lawyers to task, directly and more likely 
 
 32 JUAN-LUIS VIVES, A VERY FRUTEFUL AND PLEASANT BOOKE CALLED THE INSTRUCTION 
OF A CHRISTEN WOMAN (1557).  For discussion, see PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW 170-71 (1995). 
 33 CALLIÈRES, supra note 29, at 150. 
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indirectly, by reintroducing what law has historically separated itself 
from: amity, community, femininity, felicity.  And as a discipline its 
conceptual apartheid or setting apart has encompassed rhetoric, 
aesthetics, literature and love.  He resided with these specters of an 
earlier law, these imaginary beings, and he allowed them to be seen.  
His work thus called up the most historic of juridical specters, that of 
justice, a woman, a spirit not so far from law and yet separate from it 
and never visible enough.  He offered the most radical of opportunities, 
by virtue of his fame, by virtue of his difference.  For legal scholars he 
proffered the option of taking scholarship seriously, the possibility of 
writing as someone other than a lawyer, in a different genre and yet not 
without relation to justice, not without import for law. 
His success, his fame and his notoriety, has also frequently been a 
puzzle.  But in relation to legal studies it is not really such a surprising 
phenomenon.  Cusset, in his study of the reception of French 
intellectuals in the United States, suggests that their appeal was a 
combination of their difference and their aura of exile.34  They were 
granted an exotic form of theoretical asylum by means of which 
American intellectuals, and their campus cohorts could return 
vicariously to the theater of their roots and re-enact their own exile, 
their own passage to the New World.  Their success was in this sense a 
product of the fact that they offered a displaced stage upon which to act 
out the drama of American identity, its endless translations, its 
deconstructive mode of becoming.  The same is probably true in law.  
Derrida’s work provided a theatrical staging, a dramatic presentation of 
the trauma of American law.  It is after all more obviously foreign, more 
evidently imported and translated, younger and so visibly closer to its 
European roots than is English common law which long ago determined 
to disguise its continental origins, its Roman parents.  The concept of 
deconstruction in part legitimated and in part allowed for critical 
analysis of what was very obviously a disparate and foreign 
transplantation of law.  Derrida allowed legal scholars to listen to the 
specters of law, the displaced, transplanted and exiled internal voices.  
He appealed to the excluded, to the submerged figures of gender and 
politics.  He made available the invisible traces of class, of racial and 
sexual exclusion, the hidden injuries upon which the dominant figures 
of law were built.  That appealed and also enraged.  It still does.  It is 
not over.  He lives-on. 
At a broader cultural level the success of Derrida in legal 
scholarship is also explicable in fairly immediate terms.  The last 
century of American jurisprudence began and ended with the 
importation of continental theories of language.  The great scholarly 
 
 34 CUSSET, supra note 10, at 27, 344. 
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excitements of the twentieth century were equally occasioned by 
importations of theory.  It was a constant theme.  The signal moments 
were those of German historicism and its critique of verbal abstraction, 
of magical rights, of legalese, then English analytic philosophy of 
language, and finally, third moment, the return of philology, continental 
theory, deconstruction.  The specter of Europe hung over American 
legal studies and the more that the U.S. legal academy sought to 
proclaim its originalism, its uniquely American identity, the discrete 
character of its common law, the more the specters of its European roots 
rose to visibility.  The figure of legal nationalism is after all a very 
common one.  It is frequently stated and just as frequently disproved by 
the very language of its enunciation, by the foreign terms and concepts 
that are claimed as “ours,” by the specters of history, the pain and 
injustice of death.  Derrida, more than any other theorist, controversial, 
complex, appealing in being exotic, attractive because foreign, 
infuriating yet amicable, was the pure witness, the best available thinker 
of those worrying specters, those haunting injustices of both memory 
and method. 
And finally, closing statement, envoi: un cygne noir—a black 
swan.  The reference is to a comment of Kant’s, namely that a true 
friend, a moral friendship, is as rare as a black swan.35  Which is more 
descriptive than melancholic, more celebratory than lachrymose, more 
colorful than nocturnal.  Black swans are rare birds but they can be 
seen, they do exist, they make their presence felt, if rarely and 
tentatively.  And one can go further, find other and more dangerous 
supplements.  Juvenal, from whom the reference derives, and as Derrida 
notes, used this figure of avian rarity to depict the impossibility of true 
friendship with a woman, with a wife.36  The figure raises another, and 
Juvenalian specter.  It is that of the engendering of friendship, the 
emotional immediacy of amity, the quixotic reality of the presence of 
the friend that even Jacques found hard to acknowledge.  He cautioned 
incautiously against the challenging fraternity, he acknowledged his 
love of his family of brothers and so kept his feelings, his personal 
history away from his texts, his knowledge, his law.37 
 
 35 The precise reference is IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE: PART II OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 46-47 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).  Kant himself is quoting 
JUVENAL, SATIRES, at vi, 170 (Hubert Creekmore trans., 1963)—“a rare bird on this earth, as rare 
as a black swan” [rara avis in terris, nigroque simillima cygno].  As for the German version, 
courtesy of my correspondence with Pierre Legrand, grand philologue qu’il est, “Diese (blos 
moralische Freundschaft) ist kein Ideal, sondern (der schwarze Schwan) existirt wirklich hin und 
wieder in seiner Vollkommenheit.”  I am taking the comment here from an interesting essay by 
the late Hans-Georg Gadamer, Amitié et Solidarité, in L’AMITIÉ 233 (Jean-Christophe Merle & 
Bernard Schumacher eds., 2005). 
 36 Derrida’s discussion of Kant’s reference to the black swan is contained in DERRIDA, supra 
note 27, at 258. 
 37 Away at least from direct expression.  Thus the warning against challenging the brothers 
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Avital took this up in her presentation.38  She challenged that 
silence, that said of the unsaid, and mixed in the confession of secrets, 
the play of intimate anecdotes, the deeply personal encounters that mark 
the life of a friendship, the binding and unraveling of amity, the 
pleasures and failures of emotional presence.  There is an engendered 
and embodied amity that underpins the theater of truth and law.  It 
rarely gains expression.  It frightened Derrida in the same way that the 
unconscious disturbs, in the same way that emotions unsettle our 
preconceptions, in the same way that the shadow of a bird seen out of 
the corner of the eye portends.  And Avital, phonetically á vie, to life, 
and so to friendship, is also identical with avis, Latin for a bird, and 
perhaps a black bird, a swan even, and there too a curious and pleasing 
play of the sign, un signe noir one might say. 
So that is not all.  It never is.  To be explicit about it, un cygne noir 
is the phonetic equivalent of un signe noir or black sign, an epitaph or 
memorial.  That very Derridean play upon the sign, that “derridanse” 
allows us to acknowledge the death that this symposium recognizes, the 
black border, the liminal non-presence that lies at its origin.  A black 
sign may be a marker of  the failure of friendship, of death, even of 
plague or radical demise, but it also carries further and less melancholy 
meanings.  For example, the clergy wears black, so Dr. Taylor informs 
us, and he notes that the law requires it, that it tends to the good.  Thus 
the black monks or Benedictines, harbingers of faith and sanctity.  
Black vestments mark the man—quia habitus virum ostendit—or so 
apparently the doctors variously say.  Black garments, dark signs, are 
good for the soul, because there is religion in the color, in the black.39  
A black sign then as the marker of the extremity of all color and by that 
figure a sign of the soul, the harbinger of spirit, the no more one, of the 
more than one. 
To this we can add all the later uses of black signs and most 
notably in law.  The Gothic typeface or black letter became a synonym 
for legal documents, and the black letter rule came eventually and 
ironically to refer to the ipsissima verba or very words of command.  
Like the black rod they ushered in the majesty of legality, the person of 
the ruler.  And that is just a start, a little play upon the possible 
meanings of a phrase that is phonetically identical in the original French 
with the title chosen to mark the epitaph of an Algerian Jewish 
philosopher and litteratus.  In the old sense of the term, a cleric, a 
 
that comes at the very end, emblematically, in Politics of Friendship, and the ambivalence of the 
syntax as well as the coyness of the reference: “in my ‘family’ and in my ‘families’—I have more 
than one, and more than one ‘brother’ of more than one sex, and I love having more than 
one . . . .”  DERRIDA, supra note 27, at 305. 
 38 Avital Ronell, Saying Good-Bye: A Home Video, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 979 (2005). 
 39 JEREMY TAYLOR, DUCTOR DUBITANTIUM, OR THE RULE OF CONSCIENCE 291 bk. III, ch. 4, 
R. 15 n.7 (1660). 
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scholar, an eruditus.  It is a start.  And black is also and more physically 
a marker of race, of Africa, of Derrida’s itinerary there and back, a 
constant reminder one might say of his return, his embrace of the black 
specter of both origin and of demise.  What he offered is what he left us 
with.  Isn’t that always in some sense the case.  He left us with his spirit.  
He left us with his sense of injustice, with the spirits, the revenants or 
remembered specters with which he had so determinedly confronted 
authority and law.  He always said it would end badly and in a sense it 
always must.  But he also lives on.  He knew he would.  And herewith, 
black letters, black borders, in memoriam, his epitaph, a living on and 
fifty reasons why. 
 
